Falling Through the Cracks: A Dynamical Model for the Formation of
  In-Groups and Out-Groups by Yang, Vicky Chuqiao et al.
Falling Through the Cracks: A Dynamical Model for
the Formation of In-Groups and Out-Groups
V. Chuqiao Yang1, Tamara van der Does1, and Henrik Olsson1
1Santa Fe institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe NM 87501, USA.
ABSTRACT
Social categorizations are an important aspect of human society, dividing people into “us” and “them”
often along attributes such as race or even political ideology. Social categorizations can, on the one
hand, lead to a sense of belonging, and on the other hand, fuel conflicts. Thus, it is vital to understand
where and how the boundaries for social categories form. We present a dynamical systems model for
the formation of two social groups on a continuous attribute. Our model makes the surprising prediction
that individuals in the middle of the spectrum are seen as “them" by both social groups, and “us" by
neither. We refer to these individuals as inbetweeners. We test the model’s prediction using US political
survey data on how political independents are perceived by registered party members, as well as existing
experiments on the perception of racially ambiguous faces, and find support. Our model suggests that
inbetweeners can arise as the result of both groups drawing a more restrictive boundary than the middle
of the spectrum, motivated by improving categorization accuracy alone. The model prediction is general
and may be extended to social categorization along many other attributes.
Keywords: dynamical system, applied mathematics, categorical perception, social groups
1 Introduction
Dynamical systems models instantiated in simple differential-equations have been able to explain and
predict many complex social phenomena [1]. Examples include modeling the extinction of minority
languages [2], the decline of religious affiliation [3], the polarization in the US Congress [4], and changes
in party memberships in the UK [5]. A remaining challenge in this field is to establish greater connection
with the social sciences, such as grounding the models in established empirical findings. In this paper, we
use a simple differential-equation based model to explore the formation of social categories. We draw on a
number of existing findings in cognitive science and social psychology to motivate key hypotheses of our
model and help bridge the gap between fields.
Social categorizations are a complex and important aspect of social interactions. The division between
“us" and “them" occurs on many attributes, such as race, gender, sexual orientation, and political ideology
[6]. On the one hand, these social categorizations fulfill a sense of community and a positive sense of
self [7]. On the other hand, they can fuel social conflicts and impact certain groups’ access to economic
and social resources [8–10]. For example, the division between White and Black Americans has led to
continuing discrimination and segregation long after the abolition of slavery [11]. Recently, the divisions
between Democrats and Republicans have created fear and loathing among US voters [12]. In addition,
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individuals can also “fall through the cracks” of social categorizations and thus do not belong to any group.
We refer to these individuals as inbetweeners. Examples could include mixed-race individuals considered
neither truly Black nor White by members of either group, or political independents being considered as
“other” by both Democrats or Republicans.
Most empirical and theoretical research on social categories in the social sciences presupposes existing
classifications instead of studying the process of category formation. For example, most experimental
empirical work on individual classifications of race or gender attributes presents participants with pre-
determined and forced choices [for a review, see 13]. Similarly, theoretical research on categorization tends
to use models that assume a category structure in which individuals can be placed. For example, in the
exemplar-based model of social judgment [14], an extension of the widely used generalized context model
of categorization [15], the categories are supposed to be known, and an individual must belong to one of
the existing categories, thus not accounting for inbetweeners. Overall, these strands of research impose
categories and do not study the formation of self-organized social groups. As a result, little is known about
how self-organized social categories form, and even less on how inbetweeners are perceived.
In this paper, we go beyond the assumption of fixed social categories and use a dynamical systems
approach to derive group-level phenomena from individual-level processes. We present a new model of
the formation of two social categories on a continuous attribute based on differential-equations. Motivated
by social psychological processes such as individuals’ needs for developing a positive sense of self [7, 16]
and forming successful collaborations with others [17], we start with the assumption that people want to
correctly categorize themselves and others based on their similarity on the continuous attribute dimension,
and thus create a boundary between an in-group and an out-group. The model predicts each group’s
boundary based on 1) computing the individual categorization accuracy given their characteristics and
the social boundary, and 2) optimizing the collective categorization accuracy of the in-group members.
Through this individual and group process, a socially accepted boundary is created. This model predicts
that social groups draw a boundary more exclusive than the median of the spectrum, and as a consequence,
the individuals in the middle of the spectrum are perceived as out-groups by members of both social
groups, becoming the inbetweeners in the system.
2 The Mathematical Model
We model the formation of two social groups1 on a continuous attribute. We will derive two governing
equations, one for the boundary position of each group. We show in details the derivation for one group,
and that for the other group will be similar. The derivation is achieved in two parts. In the first part (section
2.2), we derive the error in categorization accuracy for each individual as a function of their attribute value
and the boundary position. In the second part (section 2.3), the group collectively decides the boundary
position, by minimizing the collective error of the in-group members.
2.1 Model setup
We denote the lower and upper bounds of the continuous attribute value x to be a and b, respectively, and
the population distribution on the attribute to be ρ(x). For the group containing the left extreme of the
attribute, we denote the boundary position that divides the in-group and out-group to be z (see Figure 1 for
1For simplicity, we present the model for two groups, which already leads to complex model behavior. The modeling
framework is readily extendable to n groups.
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an illustration of the variables). Individuals with attribute values smaller than z are the in-group, while the
out-group is comprised of individuals with values greater than z. We denote the similarity between two
positions x1 and x2 to be s(x1,x2). Similarity is a concept in cognitive science that describes how similar
two attribute values are to human perception. Empirically, similarity is a nonlinear decreasing function
with the distance between x1 and x2. In this paper, we use the functional form of
s(x1,x2) = exp(−c|x1− x2|) , (1)
where c is the sensitivity parameter—larger c means individuals are more sensitive to differences in
attribute space. Variants of this functional form is used in many categorization and social judgment models
[e.g., 14] and it is motivated by evidence reviewed in [15, 18]. In appendix A, we show that our major
predictions are robust when using one-norm distance as an alternative measure of similarity.
!
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Figure 1. Illustration of the variables in the model. The illustration is presented from the perspective of a member
of the group on the left, interacting with an individual on the other side of the group boundary. The individual
categorization error is the difference between the perceived similarity (derived from perceived distance) and the
actual similarity (derived from actual distance).
2.2 Derive the individual categorization error.
As described previously, we derive the error in categorization accuracy for each individual as a function
of their attribute value and the boundary position. The central insight from decades of research on
categorization is that our cognitive system searches for patterns and structures [19]. The perception and
cognitive representations of these patterns and structures can take many forms. In line with prototypical
theories of category representations [20, 21], we assume a simple prototypical representation in the form
of the mean position of a group. That is, we assume that all individuals categorized in the same group are
perceived to have the group’s mean position. For example, all individuals categorized under “Democrat”
are perceived to have the mean position of all Democrats.
The mathematical representation of this idea is as follows. Let gin(z) and gout(z) denote the group positions
for the in-group and the out-group, respectively, defined as the center of mass of the population distribution
in each group,
gin(z) =
∫ z
a x ρ(x)dx∫ z
a ρ(x)dx
, and gout(z) =
∫ b
z x ρ(x)dx∫ b
z ρ(x)dx
. (2)
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Consider a person in the in-group, with position u (u< z) on the attribute space. Let v denote a person
randomly sampled from the population. The term s(u,v) represents the actual similarity between the
individual at u and the sampled person at v. The perceived similarity of the two individuals under
categorical perception is the similarity between the two group positions: if v is in-group, s(gin(z),gin(z));
and if v is out-group, s(gin(z),gout(z)) (see figure 1 for an illustration).
We consider that one of the purposes of social categorization is to tell people apart accurately, so that
individuals can categorize people different from them as out-group, and people similar as in-group. Several
social psychological processes support this hypothesis. Following a Game Theory argument, individuals
may want to correctly categorize other people in order to be able to maximize their chances for successful
collaborations [17, 22]. Beyond collaborations, individuals may want to correctly determine other people’s
similarity levels out of a desire to create a community and a positive sense of self, as described by
classic Social Identity Theory [7, 16]. In line with this hypothesis, we define the categorization error
between a person at u and an encountered person at v to be the squared difference between the actual
similarity and the perceived similarity: if v is in-group, [s(gin(z),gin(z))− s(u,v)]2, and if v is out-group,
[s(gin(z),gout(z))− s(u,v)]2. The categorization error for the individual at u perceiving all sampled
individuals is the integral of these errors with respect to v, weighted by the population density ρ ,
err(u,z) =
∫ z
a
[s(gin(z),gin(z))− s(u,v)]2ρ(v)dv (3)
+
∫ b
z
[s(gin(z),gout(z))− s(u,v)]2ρ(v)dv .
The first term in equation (3) represents the error when the sampled person is in-group (v< z). The second
term represent the case when the sampled person is out-group (v> z, the case illustrated in figure 1). In
the first term, the expression can be simplified since s(gin(z),gin(z)) = 1. The individual error is a function
of both the individual position u and the boundary position z.
2.3 Derive group categorization error and group boundary.
We present here the second part of the derivation, where the group collectively decides the boundary
position. Based on the insights from Game Theory and Social Identity theory described above [7, 16,
17, 22], we assume individuals negotiate to decide on the group boundary, by minimizing the average
collective categorization error of the in-group. This assumes that only the in-group utility matters for
deciding the location of the group boundary. The average collective in-group error is
Err(z) =
1∫ z
a ρ(x)dx
∫ z
a
err(u,z)ρ(u)du . (4)
Note that because equation (4) calculates the average collective error, the model does not impose any
preferences on group size.
Finally, we let the group dynamically adjust its boundary positions to minimize the collective error,
dz
dt
=−kdErr(z)
dz
, (5)
where t is time, and k is a constant that sets the time scale of the system. The intuitive understanding
of equation (5) is that the category boundary evolves towards the direction that reduces the in-group’s
collective categorization error. Equation (5) concludes the derivation of the governing equation for the
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group boundary for the group on the left side of the attribute space. By symmetry, the same process
determines the group boundary for the group on the right, leading to a similar governing differential
equation.
3 Results
3.1 Uniform attribute distribution
(b)
!Group 1
Group 2
In-group Out-group
Out-group In-group
Boundary of group 1
Boundary of group 2
(a)
Figure 2. Stable fixed points of boundary positions for both groups. (a) Solutions in the case of c= 1. Green and
red show the region seen as in-group by groups 1 and 2, respectively. Light grey shows the regions seen as
out-groups by either group. Individuals between the two boundaries are seen as out-groups by members of both
social groups (inbetweeners). (b) Solutions as a function of the sensitivity parameter, c. The dark grey region
represents the inbetweeners. Both panels are for uniform attribute distribution ρ(x) defined for x between 0 and 1.
We first present the results in the case where the attribute distribution ρ(x) is a uniform distribution
between 0 and 1, to demonstrate the behavior of the model. We choose the uniform distribution here
because of its mathematical simplicity and will explore more general distributions in the next subsection.
We solve dErr(z)/dz= 0 numerically (as there is no closed-form expression for the solution), and find
that equation (4) has one stable fixed point, suggesting there is a stable boundary position for each social
group.
A surprising finding is that the stable boundary position for the two groups do not coincide, and both
groups’ preferred boundaries are more exclusive than the median of the attribute space, 0.5. For example,
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for c = 1, the solution for the stable fixed point is z∗ = 0.30. This result means that individuals with
positions between 0 and 0.30 are considered in-groups by group 1 (the group including the left extreme
of the attribute), and those between 0.30 and 1 are considered out-groups. By symmetry, group 2 (the
group including the right extreme of the attribute) has preferred boundary at 1− z∗ = 0.70, meaning
individuals between 0.70 and 1 are considered in-groups, and those between 0 and 0.7 out-groups. This
result leads to individuals between 0.3 and 0.7 to be perceived as out-groups by both groups, whom we
refer to as inbetweeners (see panel (a) of figure 2 for an illustration). Panel (b) of figure 2 shows solutions
of boundary positions of the two groups (z∗ and 1− z∗) as a function of c . As c increases, meaning people
more sensitive to differences in the attribute space, the social group boundaries become more exclusive.
For all c> 0, the fixed point satisfies z∗ < 0.5, meaning inbetweeners occur for all values of c.
3.2 Beta attribute distribution
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3. Solutions of the fixed points of boundary positions (z) for both groups as a function of c, for Beta
distribution ρ(x) defined for x between 0 and 1. Panels (a) and (b) show the distribution ρ(x) that generated the
results in panels (c) and (d), respectively. The shape parameters used are (a): α = 2, β = 2; (b): α = 2, β = 4.
The occurrence of inbetweeners is not unique to the uniform attribute distribution. Here we show results
obtained considering the attribution distribution ρ(x) to be a Beta distribution. The Beta distribution
is parameterized by two positive shape parameters, α and β , with probability density function f (x) =
xα−1(1− x)β−1/B(α,β ), where B(α,β ) = Γ(α)Γ(β )/Γ(α+β ), and Γ(·) is the Gamma function. The
distribution is defined for x in the interval [0,1]. We choose the Beta distribution because by adjusting the
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shape parameters, we can produce a wide variety of unimodal distributions, both symmetrical and skewed.
A number of real-world attribution distribution is known to be unimodal, such as political ideology of the
US public, measured by positions on public policy issues [23].
Panels (a) and (b) in figure 3 show two examples of the Beta distribution as attribute distribution ρ(y), one
symmetrical and one asymmetrical. We solve for the fixed points of equation (5) and their stability for
given c values and the shape parameters α and β . In panels (c) and (d) of figure 3, we show numerical
solutions for the fixed points boundary positions and their stability given the two attribute distribution
in panels (a) and (b), respectively. In both panels of figure 3, the inbetweeners appear. Note that in the
upper regions of panel (d), only one social group forms. As c increases, the group boundaries, marked
by the stable fixed points, become more exclusive, similar to the results in the uniform distribution case
(shown in figure 2). Different from the uniform distribution results, the dynamical system has a stable and
an unstable fixed point for c smaller than a critical value. As c exceeds this critical value, a saddle-node
bifurcation occurs, and the system has no fixed points for c greater than the critical value. This behavior
predicts that when people are too sensitive to small differences among people, categorization along this
attribute ceases to exist.
3.3 Validate model’s prediction with empirical findings
Our model predicts that those in the middle of the attribute space are seen as out-group by both social
groups. In this section, we first perform analysis on empirical data from a US political survey to verify
our prediction, then summarize existing experimental studies on the perception of racially ambiguous
individuals to show qualitative support.
3.3.1 Compare model’s prediction with political surveys.
Figure 4. The mean thermometer values (reflecting feeling favorably or unfavorably) towards both political parties
and political independents reported by registered party members from ANES data. The error bars are 95%
confidence interval of the mean. For both registered Democrats and Republicans, political independents are
perceived similarly compared to members of the other party, while members of own party are perceived more
favorably.
To test the prediction of inbetweeners, we use the American National Election Studies (ANES) dataset.
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This dataset is a large nationally representative survey of political attitudes among the US public, reported
on the individual level. In our analysis, we utilize the self-reported party registration as well as a set of
thermometer questions that evaluate whether people feel favorably or unfavorably toward a number of
social groups (such as Democrats, Republicans, and political independents). In each thermometer question,
participants are asked to report a number between 0 and 100—if they feel favorably about a group, a
number greater than 50, and if they feel unfavorably about them, a number lower than 50 (see appendix B
for source and questionnaire details). We use data from years 1980 and 1984, because the thermometer
questions about political independents were only asked in these two years’ surveys. The data we utilize
contain 1923 individuals in total.
We use registered Democrat and Republican party members to represent the two groups on opposite sides
of a continuous spectrum. In order to measure whether individuals are seen as in- or out-group, we compare
thermometer scores given to individuals clearly in the in-group (e.g., Republicans for Republicans), in the
out-group (e.g., Republicans for Democrats), and politically independents. We want to test if independents
are perceived by both parties as part of the out-group (low thermometer score similar to the other party),
in-group (high thermometer score similar to own party), or somewhere in between (neither high or low,
between other and own parties). If feelings towards independents are similar to feelings towards other
party, then the data supports our models’ prediction.
Figure 4 shows the mean thermometer values for political independents, Democrats, and Republicans,
reported by registered members of both parties. For both registered Democrats and Republicans, political
independents are perceived similarly to members of the other party, while members of own party are
perceived a lot more favorably. We perform a two-sided t-test and show that for Republican party members,
the mean of thermometer values for Democrats and those for political independents are indistinguishable
(p= 0.42). The same test shows that for registered Democrats, the mean value for Republicans is slightly
higher than that of the political independents (p< 0.001). The own party is perceived significantly more
favorably than both the other party and the independents (p< 0.001).
3.3.2 Perception of racially ambiguous individuals in existing empirical studies.
Our model’s prediction is also in agreement with experimental studies on racial categorizations. In-group
members tend to categorize ambiguous individuals as out-group, a process known as the in-group over-
exclusion effect, and confirmed in a number of empirical studies [13, 24]. First, using established racial
categories, perceivers in the U.S. tend to categorize racially ambiguous individuals as the out-group
[25, 26], which was replicated in South Africa [27] and Italy [28]. Second, using memory tests, an
experimental study [29] found that racially ambiguous faces are perceived as out-groups by mono-racial
individuals. Finally, using open-ended categorization, a recent study pointed out that perceivers use a
third category (in this case, Hispanic or Middle Eastern) for racially-ambiguous individuals (who were
mixed Black and White) [30]. These studies show that racial groups tend to draw boundaries that exclude
individuals of mixed races, supporting our model’s prediction of inbetweeners.
4 Discussion
Using a simple differential-equation-based model, we find that inbetweeners, those in the middle of
the attribute space and excluded by both social groups, can arise as the result of social groups drawing
boundaries more restrictive than the median of the attribute spectrum, driven solely by a desire to improve
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categorization accuracy. Our theoretical finding is supported by empirical analysis of feelings towards
politically independent individuals reported by registered Democrats and Republicans in the ANES
data, as well as by previous empirical findings surrounding the in-group over-exclusion effect in racial
categorization [13, 24].
Besides these extensions, social categorization can involve other subtle individual-level processes in
practice. Empirical studies find that when individuals are seen as ambiguous on one attribute dimension,
the perceiver may switch to other dimensions to make its categorization [13]. For example, individuals
use cues on facial characteristics and clothing to categorize gender ambiguous people [31, 32]. Moreover,
the characteristics of the perceiver can influence the categorization process. Individuals who want to
retain their social status, who have a weak identity, or do not often interact with other groups tend to
have a stricter definition of in-group [13, 28]. Besides subtle individual-level processes, the cultural and
historical background also shape categories. For example, a salient categorization dimension in the US
and South Africa is race, due to a history of segregation, slavery, and mistreatment. However, the salient
categorization dimensions in Europe are different, such as religion or language [33]. Social boundaries
are not only different between cultures, but also evolve. In the US, the growth in immigration from
Latin America and Asia since 1965 has redefined the white-black dichotomous categorization towards a
tri-racial system, separating Whites, honorary Whites (Asian-Americans, and some Latinos), and Blacks
[34]. This is one example when the changing distribution of attributes leads to changing group categories.
The dynamical systems framework we utilized would be appropriate, in future research, to explore how
cultural changes and shifting attribute distributions lead to changes in social category boundaries.
Only a small volume of empirical studies and even fewer theoretical studies account for individuals who
do not belong to any social categories. Our model provides a rare theoretical result on how inbetweeners
can arise in social categorization. Although this work dominantly uses data on political ideology and
attitudes, we think the process modeled can be generalized to many other social categories, and our
result of inbetweeners may be extended more generally to individuals in the middle region of attribute
spaces, such as those who are mixed race, gender non-binary, or in interdisciplinary scientific fields.
With demographic shifts (more than ten million individuals in the US identify with two or more races
in 2017 [35]), the increasing visibility of gender non-binary individuals [36], and the promise of new
interdisciplinary sciences, understanding how these individuals are perceived becomes increasingly
important. However, data gathering about these individuals is minimal, especially in the census and
large-scale population surveys, making it hard to further develop scientific theories about them. We
encourage more data-gathering efforts on studying inbetweeners that are not accepted by established social
categories.
Much significance of social categories is not in the category themselves, but in how these categories affect
how individuals are perceived and treated. Our model suggests that individuals with characteristics in the
middle of the attribute space “fall through the cracks” and are seen as out-group by social groups at both
extremes. We believe this result can possibly affect many social processes. One speculative example is the
greater perceived polarization in the US public. Among the US public, the policy position distribution
has remained dominantly moderate; however, the perception of mass polarization increased in the last a
few decades due to individuals increasingly sorted into political groups and greater antipathy between
these groups [12, 23, 37]. A possible explanation of this paradox is through the political independents
perceived as out-group of both parties, which is predicted by our model and reflected in the data. Our
hypothesis is that motivated by the need for belonging and community, individuals holding moderate
political positions can be motivated to identify with one of the two increasingly polarized political parties,
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despite misalignment on issue positions, leading to increased sorting. Empirically testing how political
independents are perceived, and how this relate to sorting and perceived mass polarization, can be an
important piece of future research. One difficulty in testing this hypothesis is the lack of data. As we
noted previously, the attitude surveys on political independents were only included in the 1980 and 1984
ANES Survey and since discontinued. We encourage gathering more empirical data on how political
independents are perceived over time to enable testing of this hypothesis.
Our work comes from the perspective of the applied mathematics community, and dynamical systems
in particular. This community has seen increasing interest and success in using its quantitative tools to
address phenomena in human society. In responding to the call for incorporating interdisciplinary methods
to study human social behavior [38], our work offers insight into the process of social categorization
through synthesizing quantitative tools in dynamical system with empirical findings in cognitive science
and sociology. We hope our work serves as an example of bridging the gap between the communities
in applied mathematics and those in the social sciences and will inspire further effort from the applied
mathematics community connecting with existing findings in the social sciences.
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Appendices
A Distance-based model
In the main text, we choose similarity as the fundamental quantity because of the abundant empirical
support in cognitive science. Here we present an alternative model and show that the qualitative result of
inbetweeners is robust using another similarity metric, the one-norm distance.
Similar to equation (3) of the main text, the categorization error for an individual at position u (considering
group on the left, u< x), is
err(u,z) =
∫ z
a
(|gin(z)−gin(z)|− |u− v|)2ρ(v)dv+∫ b
z
(|gout(z)−gin(z)|− |u− v|)2ρ(v)dv . (A1)
Simplify equation (A1), using the fact that gout > gin, we have
err(u,z) =
∫ z
a
(u− v)2ρ(v)dv+
∫ b
z
(gout(z)−gin(z)− (v−u))2ρ(v)dv . (A2)
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The collective average in-group error for the group on the left is
Err(z) =
1∫ z
a ρ(x)dx
∫ z
a
err(u,z)ρ(u)du . (A3)
The dynamical system for the boundary position is,
dz
dt
=−kdErr(z)
dz
. (A4)
For an uniform distribution ρ(x), defined on x in the interval [0,1], we can analytically calculate the
collective error,
Err(z) =
1
3
z2− 1
4
z+
1
12
. (A5)
Equation (A4) has one stable fixed point, z∗ = 3/8 = 0.375, meaning the boundary position for the
group on the left side of the spectrum sets its group boundary at 0.375: this group considers those with
attribute value x< 0.375 as in-group, and x> 0.375 as out-group. A same set of equations can be derived
for the group on the right. By symmetry, the preferred group boundary of the group on the right is
1−0.375= 0.625. This leads to individuals between 0.375 and 0.625 being considered out-group by both
social groups. Results from this distance-based model show that the prediction of outsides is not unique to
the choice of similarity in our model. The prediction of inbetweeners is a more fundamental result arising
from groups setting more restrictive boundaries than the median of the spectrum in the categorization
process.
B American National Election Studies Data
The American National Election Studies data used in this paper is the cumulative data file of 1940-2016,
May 31, 2018 version. It was downloaded from https://electionstudies.org/project/
anes-time-series-cumulative-data-file/ on Oct 4, 2018.
The phrasing of the thermometer questions is as follows: “We’d also like to get your feelings about some
groups in American society. When I read the name of a group, we’d like you to rate it with what we call a
feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorably and warm toward
the group; ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorably towards the group and that
you don’t care too much for that group. If you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward a group you
would rate them at 50 degrees. If we come to a group you don’t know much about, just tell me and we’ll
move on to the next one. Using the thermometer, how would you rate the following”. The three groups
used in our analysis are “Democrats”, “Republicans”, and “political independents”.
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